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AVIATION JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAS
S. A. BAYITCH*
Jurisdiction vested in courts may be general, due to the broad sweep
of their powers and, consequently, independent of the subject matter of
the litigation. Or it may be limited to specific areas of the law involved
in the proceedings. Such specialization ratione materiae supports the
distinction between civil and criminal courts and is characteristic of ad-
ministrative tribunals. Civil jurisdiction may further be divided into
strictly civil, commercial and admiralty, responding to the needs of these
particular kinds of human activities.
Traditionally, aviation has been divided between civil (private) and
administrative (public) law. In most countries (private) aviation cases
are litigated in civil courts of general jurisdiction. However, in some
countries having a separate body of commercial law, aviation litigation
may be heard in commercial courts. In others, aviation drifted into ad-
miralty courts, not only because it borrowed many of the substantive rules
from maritime law but also because these courts have reached, in some
countries, far into aviation litigation. But as modern and as important as
aviation may have become, it has only been granted the distinction of
separate enactments, even of codes. It should be noted, however, that with
regard to adjudication in aviation matters there is practically no country'
which provides for special aviation courts, and only suggestions have ap-
peared, on the international plane, advocating a World Aviation Court to
unify rulings in private cases arising from international conventions.
2
In regard to jurisdiction particular problems arise from the fact that
aviation is prevailingly an international activity and therefore involves
legal problems touching on more than one legal system. Thus, these
problems may be solved unilaterally by municipal law or by international
cooperation through treaties. Countries with a dual system of government,
including the judiciary, face an additional problem, namely where to
allocate jurisdiction: in national (federal) or local (state) courts. Finally,
the interrelations between the judiciary and the administrative functions
in aviation, including judicial review, must not be overlooked.
*Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Miami School of Law.
AVIATION JURISDICTION
This study is an attempt to present, in outline, the rules applicable to
judicial jurisdiction both civil and criminal, in cases arising from civil
aviation. It will show how common law and civil law traditions of the
Hemisphere face jurisdictional problems created hy the same technologi-
cal phenomenon: the dynamic development of aviation.
I. UNITED STATES
ACCESS TO COURTS
Access to courts is the right of individuals or legal entities to appear
in civil litigation as a party and to proceed under the rules of the forum.
Before this right can become effective two requirements must be met: one,
to be a person or legal entity recognized by the forum; second, to be
granted the right to proceed. The ius standi in judicio of physical persons
is by now one of the human rights, although in some jurisdictions alienage
still constitutes a limitation. The recognition of the existence of a legal
entity, particularly of the corporate type, presents a more complex picture.
In some jurisdictions the question of existence was solved by resorting to
comity or to reciprocity. For many countries this question is regulated
by treaties, mainly treaties of friendship and commerce.3 The treaty with
Honduras (1937),4 for example, contains the following provision (art.
XIII) :
Limited liability and other corporations and associations whether or
not for profit, which have been or may hereafter be organized in
accordance with and under the laws, national, state or provincial,
of either High Contracting Party and maintain a central office within
the territories thereof, shall have their jurisdicial status recognized
by the other High Contracting Party, provided they pursue no aims
within its territory contrary to its laws.
A similar rule is included in the treaty with Nicaragua (1956).5 It reads
(art. XXII, para. 3) :
Companies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations with-
in the territories of either Party . . . shall have their juridicial status
(personerta juridica) recognized within the territories of the other
Party.
The Convention of Establishment with France (1959),6 applicable also to
Martinique, Guadeloupe and Guiana (art. XV, lb) provides in art. XIV,
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
para. 5 that companies of either country "shall have their juridical status
recognized within the territories of the other High Contracting Country,"
with the proviso that even though advantages under the Convention may
be denied because the company is controlled by nationals of a third party,
still the recognition of its status remains unaffected (art. XIII).
The second requirement concerns the particular right to proceed as
a party litigant.7 In many instances this right is granted in derogation
of the lex fori, by treaties. The previously mentioned treaty with Nicara-
gua, for example, provides that national and most.favored-nation treatment
shall be accorded in "courts of justice and administrative tribunals and
agencies . . . in all degrees of jurisdiction, both in pursuit and in defense
of their rights" (art. V, para. 1). 8 Essentially the same rule based on
equal (national) treatment appears in the convention with France, but
with two significant qualifications: one, providing that companies "not
engaged in activities within the other's territory shall enjoy such access
therein without any requirement of registration" (art. III, para. 1); and
the other, that the access under the equal national treatment does not
"affect the regulation of the forum concerning the cautio judicatur solvi"
in France9 (Protocol, para. 3). Finally, the Inter-American Declaration of
the Juridical Personality of Foreign Companies, signed at Washington in
193610 provides that companies constituted in any of the contracting
countries may "enter all appearances in the courts as plaintiffs or defend-
ants, provided they comply with the laws of the country in question." The
understanding added by the United States that such companies "shall
be permitted to sue or defend suits of any kind without the requirement
of registration or domestication" is apparently designed to prevent the
application of such requirements by the lex jori, if the final proviso should
be interpreted as a reservation in favor of local law.
(a) State law. In addition to proving its existence, a foreign legal
entity must meet requirements of the lex Jor, 1' unless such rule yields
to treaty law. In Florida, for example, a foreign corporation (which term
includes not only corporations established abroad but also those incorpo-
rated is a sister state) must, in order to sue, comply with the require-
ments of chapter 613 of the Florida Statutes, a provision mitigated in
interstate situations 'by the standard of undue burden on interstate
commerce.
12
(b) Federal law. In federal courts the capacity of a foreign cor-
poration to sue is "determined by the law under which it was organized"
(Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 17, B).13
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CIVIL JURISDICTION
While rules granting or denying access to court affect mainly plain-
tiffs, individual or corporate, the amenability of party defendants is of
interest primarily to corporate air carriers. 14
(a) State courts. Foreign corporations are amenable to jurisdiction
of state courts of general jurisdiction on a number of grounds. First,
through incorporation in the state, and secondly through having been
authorized by a state administrative agency to engage in business within
the state. The jurisdictional effect of such permit is tantamount to their
amenability to local courts regardless of where the cause of action arose
(connexity). Jurisdiction may also be predicated on appearance in court,
or by consent in advance (prorogation). A far-reaching method to
establish jurisdiction over foreign defendants, including corporations, has
been made available by long-arm statutes which vest jurisdiction on the
basis of a variety of jurisdiction creating acts or activities on the part
of the non-resident corporate defendant, as defined by such statutes,
which - in most instances - require also connexity.
Long-arm statutes of interest to aviation litigation may rely specifically
on activities related to aviation, or they may be more general in scope.
An example of the former type is a Florida statute (§48.19) which sup-
ports jurisdiction 'based on "operation, navigation or maintenance by a
non.resident of an . . . aircraft" in the state, provided the action arises
out of "an accident or collision in which such non-resident may be
involved". Among other long-arm statutes available in aviation litigation
are, again taking Florida as an example, 15 those which require that a
foreign corporation operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business
or business venture, or which has an office or an agency within the state
(§48.181), coupled again with connexity.' 6 Another long-arm statute of
particular interest to aviation rests on the fact that damage to persons or
property within the state was caused by a tortious act committed outside
of the state, provided the non-resident defendant "expects or should
reasonably expect the act to have consequences in this state, or in any
other state or nation, and derives substantial revenue from interstate or
international commerce" (§48.182 Fla. Stat.). 17
The various long-arm statutes apply not only in interstate but also
in international situations and may, as indicated, be used against carriers
and manufacturers.1 8 They also apply in federal courts when sitting in
diversity. 19
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There are additional bases for jurisdiction, among them quasi in rem20
and in rem.21 It should be added that the forum non conveniens doctrine
frequently appears in aviation litigation.
22
(b) Federal courts. Generally, federal jurisdiction is based on the
federal origin of the rule by which the demand is to be decided, i.e.,
federal question jurisdiction; or on the nature of the parties involved in
the litigation as, for example, diversity of citizenship or when the United
States is a party.
Federal question jurisdiction--in most instances exercised concur-
rently with state courts-is present whenever the decisive substantive
rule 23 comes from the federal Constitution, from federal laws or from
treaties (28 U.S.C. §1331a).24 Bypassing the first alternative as largely
impractical in aviation litigation, federal question jurisdiction rests, for
example, on the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. §1301 ss.) ;25 or the
Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. §1346 ss.),26 or the Death on the
High Seas Act (46 U.S.C. §761 ss.). Federal jurisdiction may also rely
on the Federal Railway Act (45 U.S.C. §151 ss.) 27 which applies to "every
common carrier by air engaged in interstate or foreign commerce . . . and
every pilot or other person who performs any work as an employee or
subordinate official of such carrier" (§ 181).
It may be added that federal jurisdiction under §1333 (a) presupposes
a claim in excess of $10,000; however, federal question cases "arising
under any act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and
commerce against restraints and monopolies" do not (§1337). 21
The third basis for federal jurisdiction are treaties ratified by the
United States, provided their provisions are fundamental for the decision
29
and not only collateral in nature as qualifying the demand or offering
defenses. In aviation cases this class of federal jurisdiction was frequently
tested in suits involving the Warsaw Convention. Since courts uniformly
hold that the Convention did not create a new cause of action30 but only
modifies substantive rules applicable under the lex fori, the mere fact
that the flight qualifies as an international flight under art. 1 of the
Convention or that recoverable damages are subject to limitations es-
tablished in art. 22, does not bring the litigation within federal jurisdic-
tion. 31 In any case, in most instances diversity jurisdiction is available. 32
Another basis for federal jurisdiction frequently used in aviation
cases is diversity of citizenship of the parties, individual or corporate,
provided the value exceeds $10,000. Such cases may arise from interstate
as well as international situations, and in both cases state long-arm
statutes may apply.
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Aviation litigation may experience removal from state to federal
courts (28 U.S.C. §1441, b), transfer and remand (§1404, a). 33 The
doctrine of forum non conveniens34 may be invoked by the defendant. An
opportunity also exists to take advantage of provisions regulating multi-
district litigation (28 U.S.C. §1407) to consolidate actions brought in
various districts but arising from the same aviation accident.3 5
Finally, federal courts have "exclusive of state courts" jurisdiction
in "any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction" (28 U.S.C.
§1333).36 Generally, such jurisdiction depends on the locality or on the
nature of the claim involved. It is granted specifically by the Federal
Death on the High Seas Act which established federal jurisdiction over
claims arising from deaths caused by a wrongful act "on the high seas
beyond a marine league from the shore of any State" (46 U.S.C. §761).
This jurisdictional grant is interpreted to include aviation accidents over
and on the surface of the high seas.3 7 Difficulties which developed regard-
ing aviation accidents within the one marine league area have been
recently clarified.38
(c) Prorogation. Contractual selection of a forum has not been
"favored by American courts. Many courts, federal and state, have de-
clined to enforce such clauses on the ground that they were 'contrary
to public policy' or that their effect was to 'oust the jurisdiction' of the
court", an attitude bound to change in view of a recent decision by the
Supreme Court holding that such forum selecting clauses, if properly
negotiated, shall be given effect.39
Prorogation is limited under art. 32 of the Warsaw Convention.
It makes "null and void" any agreement "contained in the contract"
underlying the international transportation as well as "all special agree-
ments by which parties purport to infringe the rules laid down by this
convention ...by altering the rules as to jurisdiction," but only if such
agreements have been entered into "before the damage occurred". It
would seem that prorogation is effective after the damage to be litigated
has occurred. It is interesting to note that the qualification grafted on
,arbitration in the following sentence, namely that it must be subject to
the Convention and take place within one of the "jurisdictions referred
to in the first paragraph of article 28" apparently does not apply.
(d) Arbitration. The effects of agreements to arbitrate and of the
resulting awards are regulated by state or federal law. Turning again to
Florida as an example, the Arbitration Code (ch. 682 Fla. Stat.) gives
such agreements as well as awards thereunder validity. As to federal law,
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arbitration is regulated by statute (9 U.S.C.). This title was implemented
(§200 to 208) in pursuance of the ratification of an international con-
vention to be mentioned later. It may be added that voluntary arbitration
of labor disputes in aviation is provided in the Railway Labor Act
(45 U.S.C. §157).
Provisions dealing with agreements to arbitrate and with arbitral
awards appear in some treaties of friendship and commerce. 40 The Warsaw
Convention (art. 32) provides that in regard to transportation of goods
arbitration clauses "shall be allowed, subject to this Convention, if the
arbitration is to take place within one of the jurisdictions referred to in
the first paragraph of article 28."
International regulation of arbitration was achieved by the Con-
vention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
signed at New York in 1958,41 ratified by the United States and imple-
mented by federal statute.42 This statute also includes arbitration arising
from commercial transactions with the proviso that an arbitration agree-
ment or award which is "entirely between citizens of the United States
shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention, unless that relationship
involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement
abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign
countries" (§202).
(e) International law. In addition to the basic principles of inter-
national law governing jurisdictional powers as emanating from sover-
eignty, further rules originate in multilateral treaties, among them the
widely discussed provision of the Warsaw Convention 43 (art. 28) which
reads as follows:
(1) An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his
principal place of business, or where he has a place of business
through which the contract has been made, or before the court of
the place of destination.
The Convention" provides both bases for jurisdiction: the subject
matter, namely actions for damages, apparently insofar as affected by the
Convention, and the jurisdictional contacts, four in number. Based on these
factors the Convention provides that any action of this kind "shall be
brought in the territory" of the member country identified by one of
the jurisdictional contacts. Thus, jurisdiction appears to be exclusive
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without the Convention indicating the consequences of actions and effects
of judgments recovered in member countries not so identified or in non-
member countries. However, the main difficulty in interpreting this
provision lies on whether the four contacts are designed only to identify
the country, i.e., allocate jurisdiction on the international plane to a
particular country as a whole or to function also as an internal jurisdic-
tional rule45 and as such implement or even eliminate the forum's juris-
dictional law. Recently this alternative was clearly identified. 46 In War-
saw cases
there are two levels of judicial power that must be examined to de-
termine whether suit may be maintained. The first level . . . is
that of jurisdiction in the international or treaty sense under art.
28 (1). The second level involves the power of a particular . . .
court, under federal statutes and practice, to hear a Warsaw Con-
vention case jurisdiction in the domestic sense.
Opinions supporting the exclusively international scope47 of art. 28,
para. (1) rely on the language of the article by pointing out that it refers
initially to the "territory of one of the High Contracting Parties". How-
ever, this argument weakens in the light of the subsequent language which
refers to the "court of the domicile of the carrier" and continues the same
reference to the principal place of business and to that of destination,
while omitting it only in relation to the third contact.
Such inconsistencies may be attributed to poor drafting, but this does
not help solve the problem. Courts have by now accepted the international
thrust of the provision and reserved internal jurisdictional aspects to the
lex fori. Consequently, the logical procedure would dictate that first the
international allocation of jurisdiction be explored and, if found, jurisdic-
tional requirements of the forum be considered. However, in a recent case
the court started out with the latter task by exploring jurisdiction in
personamn against a foreign carrier under the controlling state long-arm
statute, and only when it found that such jurisdiction existed, turned to
the discussion of the international contact. Fortunately, the court found the
contact effective by an extensive interpretation of the "place of business
through which the contract has been made".
These difficulties have been encountered mainly in countries with a
dual judicial system, particularly the United States. Bypassed by the
conferences in The Hague (1955) and in Guadalajara (1961), the
problem was taken up in Guatemala (1971).48 This last conference re-
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tained para. (1) of art. 28 unchanged, added a new para. (2) and rele-
gated the original para. (2) to para. (3). The new para. (2) reads as
follows:
In respect to damages resulting from death, injury or delay of a
passenger or the destruction, loss, damage or delay of baggage, the
action may be brought before one of the courts mentioned in para.
(1) of this article, or in the territory of one of the High Contract-
ing Parties, before the court within the jurisdiction of which the
carrier has an establishment if the passenger has his domicile or
permanent residence in the territory of the same High Contracting
Party.
The new para. (2) consists of a two part sentence connected with
an "or". Turning to the first part, it would appear at first glance that
it contains only an unnecessary repetition when referring to para. (1)
since this paragraph was retained in full. However, upon closer examina-
tion two innovations appear. The first is the limitation of the subject
matter of litigation, as compared with para. (1), namely that para. (2)
applies only in actions for damages to passengers and not shippers.49 The
second innovation is the reference to "courts mentioned in para. (1)."
Such language is hardly proper since, as it was just shown, para. (1)
makes such reference only in conjunction with three out of the four
contacts. One may speculate that this language intends to make contacts
retained in para. (1) effective on both the international and internal
level aiming them directly to the courts and thus by-passing the territory.
But such interpretation overlooks that no change occurred in the original
language of the retained para. (1) and that, probably, such intent would
have been expressed by a change in para. (1).
In analyzing the second part of the sentence contained in para. (2)
it should be noted that the contacts of domicile and of the principal place
of business of the carrier not only are reasonably clear but also ascertain-
able in fact and, moreover, in most countries paralleled by contacts used
by internal jurisdictional rules. Only the remaining two contacts cause
difficulties, particularly the place of destination which has no parallel in
most fora. Nevertheless, the amendment deals only with the third contact
(establishment), but at the same time retains the notion of business and
thus ineptly continues an unsatisfactory terminological difficulty. The
main problem, however, still lies in the two ways to interpret art. 28, the
international or the internal, the latter subordinate to the former. The
prevailing international interpretation leads, in many instances, to un-
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expected results. One, that the internationally competent country cannot
take advantage of art. 28 because the lex Jori does not conform to the
jurisdictional rules of the Convention. Or it may happen that the Conven-
tion denies jurisdiction to a particular country which, under its own juris-
dictional rules, has the power to take cognizance of the case.50
It seems that these difficulties have triggered the demand to amend
art. 28. While the first part of the new para. (2) does not respond to this
need, the second part might have been influenced by such considerations,
as poorly as they have been understood or, if understood, badly expressed
in the text. As stated, the amended para. (2) uses the third of the four
contacts, available in para. (1), as the vehicle for the reform, namely
carrier's establishment which, in the original version retained in para.
(1), remains unchanged and continues in force as the establishment
"through which the contact has been made". The additional version
adopted in para. (2) waived - within the scope of this paragraph - the
requirement of having been instrumental in contracting. Instead, it im-
poses a new alternate qualification on the contact of establishment and
introduces an additional contact related this time to the plaintiff. The
former modification requires that the carrier have an establishment
within the jurisdiction of the particular court and not within the "terri-
tory" of the respective country, according to para. (1). The supplemental
contact is the domicile or residence of the plaintiff within the respective
country and not necessarily within the particular jurisdiction of the court.
The result may be summarized by stating that now the contact of carrier's
establishment will be, under the Convention, effective under two condi-
tions: one, that it was instrumental in contracting (para. 1), or as being
located in the jurisdiction of the particular court, with the plaintiff
domiciled or residing in the same country (para. 2). However, in spite of
these innovations the chances that plaintiffs may avoid the unwanted con-
sequences of the international interpretation have not been enhanced. It
is quite possible that the forum's law might not consider plaintiff's contacts
with the forum material to support jurisdiction over the defendant based
on the contact of his establishment within the forum. This is particularly
true in countries where the operation of an establishment is, as in most
long-arm statutes in this country, only partly adequate to support jurisdic-
tion in view of the fact that, in most instances, connexity is a decisive
constitutional (due process) requirement. 5
A few additional remarks are in order. The Convention on the In-
ternational Recognition of Rights in Aircraft (Geneva, 1948)52 contains
no jurisdictional rules. Such rules are included in the Convention on Dam.
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age Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Persons on the Surface (Rome,
1952) 53 which has not been ratified by the United States. Two procedural
conventions may be of interest to aviation litigations: the Convention of
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and
Commercial Matters (Hague, 1965),14 and the Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters (Hague, 1970),
both ratified by the United States.
(f) Immunity jrom jurisdiction. According to a traditional com-
mon law rule, one's own sovereign is immune from judicial jurisdiction
unless the sovereign waives this privilege. In regard to the states, the rule
varies but seems to be on the way out. In regard to the federal govern-
ment,55 sovereignty is waived within the scope of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, frequently applied to aviation cases. In essence the Act provides that
the government is liable for torts committed by its agents acting (within
the territorial limits of the United States) within the scope of their employ-
ment as private tortfeasors would be liable "under the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred". 56
Concerning foreign countries, the traditional immunity was restricted
by the United States in the Tate Letter (1952) 57 which, distinguishing
between acts iure imperii and acts iure gestionis, denied immunity in
regard to the latter. The limited doctrine found expression also in treaties
of friendship and commerce as, for example, in the Nicaraguan treaty58
which provides (art. XVIII, para. 3):
No enterprise of either Party, including corporations, associations and
government agencies and instrumentalities, which is publicly owned
or controlled shall, if it engages in commercial, industrial shipping or
other business activities within the territories of the other Party,
claim or enjoy, either for itself or for its property, immunity therein
from taxation, suit, execution of judgment or other liability to which
privately owned and controlled enterprises are subject therein.
There is also in force, in relation to the Netherlands, a convention on the
waiver of such immunity (1953). 59 Finally, a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity is as a matter of routine included in licenses granted to foreign
carriers. 6
It may be added that a bill is presently before Congress to regulate
the question of sovereign immunity due to foreign countries.6 1
(g) Judicial v. administrative jurisdiction. By now the principle
is "firmly established that in certain cases raising issues of fact not with-
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in the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of
administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating
the subject matter should not -be passed over."'62 This principle of pri-
mary administrative jurisdiction applies also to administrative authorities
dealing with aviation even though such power may impinge on the juris-
diction of the courts as, for example, in cases involving antitrust laws in
which area the Civil Aeronautics Board has statutory functions (49 U.S.C.
§ 1382).63
The review by courts of administrative rulings is based on the ad-
ministrative record (49 U.S.C. § 1006, e) ; nevertheless, the court may
remand the case for further proceedings where additional facts are
needed.64 Final orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board or of the Secretary
of Transportation are subject to review6 5 by federal appellate courts (49
U.S.C. § 1006, b), vested with exclusive jurisdiction to "affirm, modify,
or set aside in whole or in part" the orders under review (§ 1006, d),
except orders involving foreign carriers subject to approval by the Presi-
dent (§ 1372, 1461)."6 Decisions by the appellate courts are subject
to review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari (§ 1006, f).
The enforcement of "any rule, regulation, requirement, or order
thereunder, or any term, condition, or limitation of any certificate or
permit, and the punishment of all violations thereof," including the Fed-
eral Aviation Act, is vested in the federal district court "wherein such
person carries on his business or wherein the violation occurred"
(§ 1007).6 7
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
In civil litigation the controlling law-except in federal question
cases- does not determine jurisdiction. In principle, the opposite is true
in criminal cases. In other words, a court will take jurisdiciton in a crim-
inal case only where the substantive criminal law of the forum applies,
namely to acts committed within its territorial jurisdiction except in eases
where extraterritorial application of its criminal law is proper.
(a) State courts. Criminal law, statutory and common law, in
force in the several states supports jurisdiction of state courts insofar as,
in crimes involving aviation, the matter is not preempted by federal law.
(b) Federal courts. Federal courts exercise "original jurisdiction,
exclusive of the courts of the states, of all offenses against the laws of the
United States" (18 U.S.C. § 3231).
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Criminal acts involving aviation may be common crimes committed
in relation to aviation or they may be specific crimes covering particular
situations in aviation, for example, those involving destruction of aircraft
(18 U.S.C. § 32), or air piracy (49 U.S.C. § 902, i). Related to aviation
are also crimes committed on board aircraft. In this respect an enactment
in 1952 created the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States" (18 U.S.C. § 7, para. 5)68 which includes:
Any aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United States or
any citizen thereof or to any corporation created under the laws
of the United States, or any State, Territory, District or possession
thereof, while such aircraft is in flight over the high seas, or over
any waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State.
In these cases jurisdiction is based on two contacts: first, that of property
of the aircraft (not nationality), and the second, the location of the
aircraft at the time of the commission of the crime. The crimes falling
into this jurisdiction are marked as such throughout the Criminal Code.
In 1964 new federal crimes were added, not to the Federal Criminal
Code but to the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. § 902, i to m). Some
of these crimes were punishable if committed in flight (e.g., air piracy,
§ 902, i; interference with the crew 902, j; and a list of crimes punish-
able under the Federal Criminal Code when committed within the "spe.
cial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States", § 902, k).
Other crimes added include carrying weapons aboard aircraft (Q 902, 1),
and false information (§ 902, m). The flight involved had to be a "flight
in air commerce" which includes "interstate, overseas, or foreign air com-
merce" as well as transportation of mail "within the limits of any Federal
airway", as well as "any operation or navigation of aircraft which directly
affects . . . safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce"
(§ 101, para. 20).
In pursuance of the ratification of the Tokyo Convention (1963) by
the United States, a federal statute7 0 has changed the qualification of the
three in-flight crimes (air piracy, interference with the crew and crimes
punishable within the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States") to "special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States"
(49 U.S.C. § 101, para. 32), but not with regard to the two remaining
crimes which remain punishable if committed "aboard an aircraft being
operated by an air carrier in air transportation". Consequently, the first
three crimes belong to the federal courts whenever committed in flight
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within such "special jurisdiction", i.e., from the moment power is applied
for the purpose of takeoff until the moment when the landing run ends.
This jurisdiction encompasses American registered aircraft regardless of
their location at the time of the crime and foreign registered aircraft
when the crimes listed have been committed on a flight
(i) within the United States, or
(ii) outside of the United States with its next scheduled desti-
nation or last point of departure in the United States,
provided that in either case it actually next lands in the
United States.
(c) International law. An ever increasing number of international
conventions deal with what is called criminal law of the air, both with
regard to common crimes committed in flight as well as with specific
crimes particular to aviation.
Among the conventions to which the United States is a party, the
Convention of the High Seas (Geneva, 1958)71 may be mentioned since
it deals with air piracy (art. 15 and 17), and allocates jurisdiction to
courts of the state which "carried out the seizure" of the piratical air-
craft (art. 19). Jurisdictional rules are also included in the Convention
on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo,
1963) .12 This Convention deals with criminal acts as well as "acts which,
whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize the safety of the
aircraft or of persons or property therein or which jeopardize good order
and discipline on board" (art. 1, para. 1, a and b), provided they are
committed on board an aircraft registered in a member country, while
such aircraft was in flight as defined (art. 1, para. 3), or "on the
surface of the high seas or of any other area outside the territory of any
State". The state of registration has the authority to "exercise jurisdic-
tion over offenses and acts committed on board" (art. 3), and is bound
to "take such measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction as
the State of registration over offences committed on board aircraft regis-
tered in such State" (art. 3, para. 2). However, the Convention does not
prevent any other criminal jurisdiction being available under the domestic
laws of a member state (art. 3, para. 3).
A special provision regulates the jurisdiction of member states in
regard to criminal acts committed on board aircraft registered in another
country by limiting it to a number of specific situations: (a) the offence
has effect on the territory of the state resolved to interfere; (b) the
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offence has been committed by or against a national or permanent
resident of such state; (c) the offence is against the security of such
state; (d) the offense violates rules regarding flight or operations therein;
or (e) the exercise of such jurisdiction is "necessary to ensure the observ-
ance of any obligation of such State under a multilateral international
agreement" (art. 4).
Further jurisdictional provisions are found in the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague, 1970), 7" and the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation (Montreal, 1971), 74 both ratified by the United States.
The former convention requires member countries to establish jurisdiction
not only over the particular offence of air piracy75 as defined in art. 1,
but also over other acts of violence against passengers or crew committed
in connection with piracy (art. 4, para. 1), provided (a) such acts have
been committed on board aircraft registered in the same state; or (b) the
aircraft lands in the state with the offender on board, or (c) in case of
a lease of aircraft without crew and the lessee has his principal place
of business, or at least he is a permanent resident of such state (art. 4).
The Montreal Convention adopted in essence the same jurisdictional
contacts used in The Hague Convention under (c) and (d), and added
those instances in which the offence has been "committed in the territory
of that State" (i.e., exercising jurisdiction), or has been "committed against
or on board an aircraft registered in that State" (art. 5, b), an extension
included also in art. 5 (d).
In connection with these conventions the question arises whether
or not their provisions, at least some of them, are self-executing, meaning
effective without additional federal statute. In any case, there can be no
doubt that jurisdiction exists with regard to crimes as defined and within
the protection of federal courts according to their criminal choice-of-laws
rules, and identical with those dealt with by the conventions.
II. CANADA
Even though aviation matters are within the legislative powers of
the national Parliament, 76 judicial jurisdiction in aviation cases is vested,
with few exceptions involving the Federal Court, in provincial courts of
general jurisdiction. 77 There, jurisdiction is perfected according to gen-
eral, statutory as well as decisional requirements. Service on non-resident
individual and corporate defendants (ex juris) must be authorized by
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court on ex parte application, supported by affidavit showing reasons for
granting it. The leave to serve a writ out of the jurisdiction remains
discretionary with the court. Once served, the defendant may, by leave
of court, enter a conditional (special) appearance.
The jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Canada, being a "court of
law, equity and admiralty, continued from the Exchequer Court" (See.
3)7 8 includes within its maritime jurisdiction some matters involving
aviation (sec. 22). A federal trial court has original jurisdiction, con-
current with provincial courts, of the following claims (sec. 22): for
"salvage of life, cargo, equipment or other property of, from or by an
aircraft to the same extent and in the same manner as if such aircraft
were a ship" (sec. 22, j); for "towage in respect . . . of an aircraft
while such aircraft is waterborn" (sec. 22, k), and for "pilotage in respect
of . . . an aircraft while such aircraft is waterborn" (see. 22, 1). This
jurisdiction is available (sec. 22, para. 3, b) in regard to aircraft where
the cause of action arises from the three instances just listed, regardless
of "whether those aircraft are Canadian or not and wherever the residence
or domicile of the owners may be", and whether these claims arise "on
the high seas or within the limits of the territorial, internal or other
waters of Canada or elsewhere and whether such waters are naturally
navigable or artificially made so, including . . . in case of salvage, claims
in respect to cargo or wreck found on the shore of such waters" (sec. 22,
3, c).
This jurisdiction may be exercised in personamn (sec. 43), also in rem
(art. 43, para. 2) against an aircraft, except in cases under sec. 22 (k),
involving towage, unless "at the time of the commencement of the action,
the . . . aircraft . . . that is the subject of the action is beneficially
owned by the person who was the beneficiary owner at the time when
the cause of action arose" (sec. 43, para. 3).
It may be added that the same court has jurisdiction against the
Crown in situations analogous to those within the Federal Tort Claim Act
in this country. The process of the court "shall run throughout Canada,
including its territorial waters, and any other place to which legislation
enacted by the Parliament of Canada has been made applicable" (see. 55).
Canada has ratified two conventions containing jurisdictional rules
pertaining to aviation. One is the Warsaw Convention enacted in Canada
as the Carriage by Air Law,79 with its art. 28 and 32. The other is the
Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on
the Surface (Rome, 1952), enacted as the Foreign Aircraft Third Party
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Damage Act.8s Actions based on this Convention are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts of the member country "where the damage
occurred" (art. 20, para. 1). However, litigants are free to prorogate a
forum in another member country, but proceedings there shall have no
"effect of prejudicing in any way the right of persons who bring actions
in the State where the damage occurred". Parties may also agree to
submit their disputes to arbitration provided arbitration takes place in a
member country (art. 20). Member countries promise to take all neces-
sary measures to ensure that defendants and other parties are notified
and have "a fair and adequate opportunity to identify their interests"
(art. 20, para. 2), as well as "ensure . . . that all actions arising from a
single incident and brought in accordance with para. (1) of this article,
are consolidated for disposal in a single proceeding before the same court"
(art. 20, para. 3).
Canada has ratified the three conventions dealing with crimes of
the air: Tokyo (1963), The Hague (1970), and Montreal (1971). Their
pertinent provisions are discussed elsewhere in this study.
The Act to amend the Criminal Code dealing with offences com-
mitted on board aircraft (art. 6) grants Canadian courts jurisdiction
over such acts if punishable by indictment; they are then deemed to have
been committed in Canada whenever they occurred on or in respect to
an aircraft registered in Canada, or leased without crew and operated
by a person qualified under the Aeronautics Act to be registered as an
owner of an aircraft while it is in flight, or on an aircraft whose flight
terminates in Canada. The same Act also enacted crimes of piracy, en-
dangering the safety of an aircraft and taking offensive weapons and
explosive on board.5 '
Administrative powers vested under the Act to Authorize the Control
of Aeronautics 82 in the Minister of Transportation, include authority to
issue regulations (sec. 6, para. 4). Their violation, when committed out-
side of Canada and involving Canadian aircraft, will be punished by the
court "having jurisdiction in respect to similar offences in the judicial
division of Canada where that person is found, in the same manner
as if the offence had been committed in that judicial division" (sec. 6,
para. 6).
111. LATIN AMERICA
Some of the fundamental rules on recognition of foreign legal entities
and their access to courts may be gleaned from multilateral conventions,
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signed in Montevideo in 1889, supplemented in 1940,83 and in Havana,
the later known as the C6digo Bustamante (1928). 84
The Bustamante Code refers the question of recognition of foreign
legal entities to the "territorial law" (art. 32), i.e., to rules "binding
alike on all persons residing within the territory, whether or not they are
nationals" (art. 3, para. III). Instead of such choice-of-law solution, the
Treaty on the International Terrestrial Commercial Law (1940, art. 8)
supplies a combined rule that "Commercial associations shall be governed
by the laws of the State of their commercial domicile, [i.e., principal place
of business, art. 3], shall be accorded full legal recognition in the other
contracting States, and shall be considered qualified to perform acts of
commerce and appear in law suits."
The previously mentioned Inter-American Declaration (Washington,
1936), as well as bilateral treaties supply additional rules together with
domestic enactments. The recent Business Associations Law of Argentina
(1972),S5 for example, provides that "associations established abroad are
governed in regard to their existence and form by the law of the place
where they have been constituted". If these requirements are met the
companies may engage in isolated acts and appear in courts in Argentina
(art. 118).
It will be noticed that in terms of legislation and judicial jurisdiction
aviation faces, in some Latin American countries, a dual system similar to
the one in the United States. In three such ceuntries authority to legislate
on aviation is vested in national (federal) legislatures. In Argentina the
rule appears in both aviation codes (art. 182 of the Code of 1954, Law No.
14.307, and art. 197 of the Code of 1967, Law No. 17.285). The same
policy found expression in the Brazilian Constitution (1967, art. 8, XV, c).
In Mexico such power is vested in the national Congress pursuant to art.
73 (XVII) of the 1917 Constitution as a matter pertaining to "general
means of communication".
This position is reflected in the allocation of judicial powers in
Argentina and in Brazil. In Argentina courts have since the 1940's ruled
that litigation involving aviation belongs in national (federal) courts."
In 1950 this decisional rule was enacted as an amendment (Law No.
13.998, art. 42, b) which provided that national courts shall have cogniz-
ance of cases "governed by the . . . law of aviation". The rule was con-
tinued in the first (1954, art. 183) and retained in the second Aviation
Code (1967, art. 198) where it reads:
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The cognizance and decision of cases involving aviation and air
commerce generally and of crimes which may affect them, is vested
in the Supreme Court of Justice and in subordinate courts of the
Nation.
In Brazil the jurisdictional grant to the federal judiciary is included in the
Constitution (1967, art. 119, IX) by referring to "questions of maritime
law and navigation, including air navigation". In Mexico, by contrast,
such jurisdiction is exercised by federal courts concurrently with state
courts. According to art. 104(1) of the Constitution, federal courts shall
have civil jurisdiction whenever federal laws or treaties apply, adding that
"whenever such controversies affect private interests", the controversies
may be adjudicated, at the election of the plaintiff, by "local", i.e., state
courts. This rule was refined by the subsequent Organic Law of the
Judicial Power of the Federation (1936) which vested jurisdiction re-
garding controversies "between private persons" and involving federal
laws in federal courts, at the election of the plaintiff (art. 43, I).
There is only one country in the Western Hemisphere with special
aviation courts and the only where aviation litigation is vested in military
tribunals. This mayor absurdo juridico? appears in Chile where the Law
on Air Navigation (1931) established tribunales aeronduticos (art. 76 to
91, as amended in 1944). These tribunals are manned by military officers
and exercise jurisdiction not only with regard to violations by military
personnel related to aviation but also in criminal cases against persons
who are not members of the armed forces; also in civil actions arising
from violations within military jurisdiction "in order to recover things
or their value" (art. 5, No. 4 of the Code of Military Justice). Appeals
belong before a Corte Marcia85 composed of two justices of the appellate
court in Santiago and one member of the following services: Army, Air
Force and Carabineros.
In most Latin American countries aviation litigation belongs in civil
courts of general jurisdiction. An express provision to this effect appears
in the Law on Civil Aeronautics in force in El Salvador (1955). This
law grants courts of general jurisdiction (tribunales comunes) the power
to "adjudicate in summary proceedings cases involving aviation or air
commerce in general" (art. 6, general and transitory provisions). The
Peruvian Law of Civil Aeronautics (1965) allocates actions for damages
brought by passengers or by members of the crew (art. 108) to juicios de
menor cuantia (art. 109).
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Alternatives are open in countries where commercial courts are
charged with matters within the scope of the commercial codes, provided
they include aviation among commercial activities. However, there are
countries where aviation is included in the commercial code, e.g., in
Costa Rica, but because there are no commercial courts, courts of general
jurisdiction administer the Code and related aviation regulations. On the
contrary, the Venezuelan Commercial Code (1942, art. 2) does not list
aviation among commercial activities; nevertheless, aviation cases are
litigated before commercial courts.
Jurisdiction so allocated must be defined further. In countries with
a single system of courts the delimitation must draw the line in inter-
national situations. In countries with a dual court system another line of
jurisdictional demarcation is needed to separate aviation litigation vested
in one system of courts from the jurisdictional powers of the other. This
is done in a number of Latin American countries in two ways: by a
general clause and by jurisdictional rules dealing with events on board
aircraft. Taking Argentina again as an example of countries with a dual
system of courts, the previously quoted general jurisdictional grant con-
fers upon national courts, civil and criminal, jurisdiction in matters of
aviation and air commerce.8 9 This general clause does not limit jurisdiction
to cases where the Aviation Code applies but allows also jurisdiction in
cases where, under the choice-of-law rule of the Argentine forum foreign
contract or tort law might apply. On the contrary, with regard to events
(civil and criminal) on board aircraft, Argentine judicial jurisdiction
is coextensive with the application of Argentine substantive civil or crim-
inal law. These rules deal- limiting this survey to non-public aircraft-
with domestic and foreign aircraft in a variety of situations, namely
when in flight within their own sovereignty, in areas without sovereignty,
and within foreign sovereignty at the time when the event occurs. In
essence, Argentine courts will exercise jurisdiction with regard to events
on board Argentine aircraft whenever they occur within Argentine
sovereignty or in areas under no sovereignty (art. 199, para. 1) ; or within
foreign sovereignty, provided the "legitimate interests" of Argentina or
of persons domiciled there have been affected, or if the aircraft landed
in Argentina immediately after the event (art. 199, para. 2). With
regard to events on board foreign aircraft, Argentine courts will have
jurisdiction only over events which occurred in their flight within
Argentine sovereignty and if the acts violate laws concerned with safety,
military or fiscal laws; or air traffic rules, or endanger public safety and
order or interests of Argentina or persons domiciled there or if the first
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landing took place there after the event and no extradition is requested
(art. 200). Similar jurisdictional rules appear in the Law of Civil
Aeronautics of Peru (1965, art. 5) except, that for events on board
foreign aircraft in flight within Peruvian sovereignty, the law contains
a choice-of-law rule but refrains from including jurisdiction (art. 6);
in the Aviation 'Code of Paraguay (1957, art. 156 and 157), and in the
recently enacted but vetoed Costa Rican General Law of Civil Aviation
(1973, art. 23).
Nicaragua has provisions all its own. Art. 259 of the Code of Civil
Aviation (1956) confers jurisdiction on domestic courts over claims
against Nicaraguan air carriers arising from international transportation
as well as against foreign carriers for personal injuries to Nicaraguan
passengers or aliens domiciled in Nicaragua; for the loss, average or
delay affecting goods or baggage belonging to the same kind of persons,
provided the goods or baggage have been shipped from Nicaragua or
were destined to arrive there, and for damages to persons or goods located
on the ground in Nicaragua. Jurisdiction includes (art. 250, c) "all
other cases not here included nor excluded" by these provisions.
Other Latin American aviation laws use the term jurisdiccin without
specifying that it includes also judicial powers. In the Dominican Law of
Civil Aeronautics (1969, art. 6) this term is used for events on board
aircraft. Similarly, the Regulation of Civil Aviation in force in Panama
(1963, art. 3) uses the term "Panamanian jurisdiction" when referring to
events on board aircraft. The Guatemalan Civil Aviation Law (1949, art.
3) subjects all aircraft within Guatemala to the laws of the Republic
and to the "jurisdiction of her authorities". Other republics use the term
jursdiccn y competencia, followed by choice-of-laws provisions regarding
events on board aircraft (Venezuela, art. 4) with an additional article
specifically referring to civil or commercial acts there (art. 5). The same
rules are adopted in the Law on Civil Aeronautics of Honduras (1957,
art. 3 to 5).
In countries which ratified the Warsaw (1929) and Rome (1952)
conventions, their art. 2890 and 20, respectively, apply. However, from
available materials their real impact is difficult to assess.
The effect of forum selecting clauses (pr6rroga) is regulated in two
international conventions, the Warsaw Convention (art. 32), and the
Rome Convention on Damages on the Ground (art. 20), discussed else-
where in this study. Two aviation acts contain provisions related to
aviation litigation. The Code of the Air in force in Brazil (1966, art. 7)
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denies effect unless the forum prorogatum is that of the place of destina-
tion. Nicaragua, on the contrary, allows an unrestricted choice (art. 259,
b). In other countries prorogation is regulated by the codes of civil
procedure which, as a rule, allow only agreements involving changes in
venue (competencia territorial).
As it was shown, in many countries the same jurisdictional rules
apply to civil and criminal jurisdiction, e.g., in Argentina. There are, in
some aviation acts, particular provisions for criminal jurisdiction. Brazil,
for example, has allocated to federal courts jurisdiction over crimes
"covered by an international treaty or convention and those committed on
board . . . aircraft, taking into account the jurisdiction of military
justice" (Constitution, 1967, art. 119, V). Panama allocates to regular
courts the adjudication of crimes included in the Regulation of National
Aviation (1963, art. 218 and 219). In Mexico, the federal Criminal Code
(art. 5, IV) grants federal courts jurisdiction over crimes "committed on
board national or foreign aircraft within the territory or airspace or
national or foreign territorial waters in cases analogous to these contained
in the previous section dealing with vessels."
In all cases the jurisdiction (competencia) of courts has to be per-
fected according to the respective lex Jori. This is done, in most instances,
along the maxim of actor sequitur forum rei and contacts derived there.
from. Among contacts of most interest to this study will be those which
would make non-resident carriers amenable to foreign courts. This is
achieved in two ways: by using as a jurisdictional contact the fact that
a non-resident acted within the court's jurisdiction or through local
representatives who must be appointed with sufficient authority to make
their non-resident principal amenable to local jurisdiction.
A general provision of the first kind is adopted in the Treaty on
International Terrestrial Commercial Law (Montevideo, 1889, art. 7, and
1940, art. 11) which provides that with regard to a "business association
domiciled in one contracting country and engaged in business in another,
the latter's courts will have jurisdiction in regard to claims arising there-
from." This typical long-arm statute found no general acceptance, in
spite of the fact that in some countries decisional law moves in its direc-
tion.91 There are two ways to bring foreign corporate carriers into local
courts. One is indicated in some of the aviation codes; the other is shown
in general enactments dealing with business associations, i.e., in com-
mercial codes or enactments regulating business associations generally.
An example for the first type is found in the Panamanian Regulation of
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National Aviation (1963, art. 93). It charges foreign aviation enterprises
with maintaining permanently in Panama a "representative with suf-
ficient authority to appear before administrative and judicial authorities
... in order to litigate any demand or claim which may be pressed
for acts or omissions related directly or indirectly to air transportation or
acts". Similar provisions appear in the aviation laws of El Salvador
(art. 141), Nicaragua (art. 113) and Honduras (art. 118). The recently
vetoed Costa Rican General Law on Civil Aviation (1973) provides not
only that foreign aviation enterprises must "submit expressly to this
law and to the jurisdiction of Costa Rican authorities in case of damage
to passengers, cargo or baggage, or to persons or goods on the ground"
and waive diplomatic intervention (art. 145, c), but also appoint in
Costa Rica a permanent representative with full powers (poder general-
isimo) "sufficient to attend to business of the company" (art. 178).
As indicated, further provisions emanate from rules applicable to
foreign business associations generally. The Argentine Law on Business
Associations (1972), for example, makes foreign business associations
amenable to Argentine courts on the basis of an "isolated act through the
person of an agent (apoderado) who intervened in the act or contract out
of which the cause of action arose (motive el litigio)" or where there
is a subsidiary or establishment (asiento) or other kind of representation
(art. 122)92 Similarly, the Commercial Code of Colombia (1971) requires
that in order to transact business there, a foreign business association
must, among other requirements, designate a general agent (mandatario
general) authorized to conduct business within the scope of the charter
and to "represent the subsidiary for all legal purposes" (art. 472).
In some Latin American countries additional functions in aviation
matters are given to the judiciary. In Argentina, for example, records
executed by administrative authorities in cases of damages caused by
aircraft will be forwarded to judicial authorities (art. 203) ; for their
part, courts as well as police and security forces which intervene in
matters involving aircraft or aviation are bound to inform proper ad-
ministrative authorities (art. 207). The investigation of aviation accidents
is generally within the functions of administrative authorities. However,
the Ecuadorean Law of Air Transit (1950) makes it a judicial function
(art. 32) and courts at the locus delicti will take jurisdiction of actions
for damages caused to persons or things by aircraft, domestic or foreign
(art. 34, para. 1).
Administrative decisions in aviation matters are, in most Latin
American countries, subject to administrative review in three ways: by
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the respective Ministry or by administrative tribunals or both. In Para-
guay (art. 170) and in Uruguay (art. 171) appeals go to the Ministry
which in both countries "closes the administrative way". In Uruguay
the administrative decision may also be attacked for illegality before
courts of general jurisdiction until an administrative tribunal has been
established (art. 182). In other republics judicial review is available
in cases of high fines as, for example, in Venezuela (art. 83). Peru allows
review by the Supreme Court of administrative rulings involving not
only penalties but also suspensions or cancellations of permits (art. 113,
para. 2). In Colombia recourses against administrative acts is limited
mainly, even though not exclusively, to administrative tribunals.94 In
many Latin American countries there is a possibility for judicial review
of legislative 95 as well as administrative regulatory acts on constitutional
grounds. In Mexico, for example, individual administrative acts may be
contested through amparo whenever they violate civil rights guaranteed
by the Constitution (art. 2 to 28).16
In conclusion, the following general impressions may be registered.
A strong adherence to traditional jurisdictional principles persists in the
Hemisphere coupled with a lack of domestic jurisdictional rules designed
to cope with international situations, except those applicable to specific
situations as, for example, to events on board aircraft. National interests
prevail not only in developing aviation policies but also in the legislative
and judicial powers being vested in national authorities in countries with
a dual system of government. Even though in some countries administra-
tion of aviation is entrusted to military departments, civil courts, with
one exception, prevail. And finally, the contribution by treaties to in-
ternational jurisdictional problems arising in aviation is rather limited,
due not only to a small number of ratifications of the respective treaties
but also to difficulties in their application.
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